Introduction to the Brahma-gâla Sutta

Sacred-Texts Buddhism   

{p. xxv}

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

BRAHMA-GÂLA SUTTA.

   THE phase of beliefs which this Suttanta is intended to meet, into which its argument fits, has been set out in some detail in the opening chapter of my 'American Lectures.' As there pointed out{1}, the discussion which thus opens this series of dialogues forms also the first question in the Kathâ Vatthu, and the first question in the Milinda, We cannot be far wrong if, in our endeavours to understand the real meaning of the original Buddhism, we attach as much weight to this question as did the author or authors of these ancient and authoritative Buddhist books.

   The Suttanta sets out in sixty-two divisions{2} various speculations or theories in which the theorisers, going out always from various forms of the ancient view of a 'soul'--a sort of subtle manikin inside the body but separate from it, and continuing, after it leaves the body, as a separate entity--attempt to reconstruct the past, or to arrange the future. All such speculation is condemned. And necessarily so, since the Buddhist philosophy is put together without this ancient idea of 'soul.'

   The Buddhist scheme endeavours, in other words, to include all the truth which previous thinkers had grafted on to the old savage theories of a semi-material, subtle, permanent entity inside the body, while rejecting those theories themselves; it endeavours to retain all the philosophic truth which previous thinkers had grafted on to the theosophies--the corollaries of the soul theories--while rejecting those theosophies themselves. The reasons given for this position are threefold: firstly, that such speculators about ultimate things,

{1. 'American Lectures on Buddhism.' London, 1896, pp. 38-43.

2. Summed up below, pp. 52, 53; and set out more fully in the list in the 'American Lectures,' pp. 31-33.}

{p. xxvi}

either in the past or the future, have insufficient evidence. see only one side of the shield{1}; secondly, that such speculations do not lead to emancipation, to Arahatship{2}; and thirdly, that such theories are really derived from the hopes, the feelings, and the sensations arising from evanescent phenomena{3}--they belong, in other words, to the realm of hastily formed, empirical opinion (ditthi), not to that of the higher wisdom (paññâ). So that Buddhism, in the first place, holds a position somewhat similar to the modern Agnostic position. Secondly, while acknowledging the importance of feeling and of intellect, it lays special stress upon the regulation, the cultivation, of the will{4}. And thirdly, it distinguishes between a lower and a higher wisdom{5}.

   Several scholars, and especially--with more knowledge and detail--Dr. Karl Neumann, have maintained that the position of Buddhism in the history of Indian philosophy is analogous to that of Schopenhauer in European philosophy. On the other hand, it is maintained by Professor Deussen that Schopenhauer's position is analogous to that of the Upanishads. The reconciliation will probably be found to be that what Buddhism took over, with more or less of modification, from the Upanishads, is about the same as that part of the Upanishad doctrine which is found, in European phraseology, in Schopenhauer; and what Buddhism rejected altogether is not to be found in Schopenhauer. He himself, who however knew both systems only from second-hand and inaccurate authorities, says, 'If I am to take the results of my own philosophy as the standard of truth, I should be obliged to concede to Buddhism the pre-eminence over other (systems of philosophy).'

   However this question may be decided--and its discussion, at the necessary length, by a competent student of philosophy, is a very pressing want--it is certain from the details given in our Suttanta that there were then current in Northern India many other philosophic and theosophic speculations besides those the priests found it expedient to adopt, and have preserved for us in the Upanishads. And who can doubt but that some, if not all of them, may also have had their influence on the new doctrine? There was always much philosophising in India outside the narrow and inexact limits

{1. See the fable quoted below, pp. 187, 188.

2. See below, pp. 44, 188.

3. See for instance below, pp. 53, 4.

4. See the paper on 'The Will in Buddhism,' J. R. A. S., 1898.

5. See below, p. 42, &c., of this Suttanta.}

{p. xxvii}

of the so-called six Darsanas; and we have to thank Buddhist scholars for preserving, in their Pâli and Sanskrit works, the evidences of such philosophy as the priests wished to exclude from notice{1}.

{1. Professor Cowell has been good enough to inform me that, in his opinion, the attempted restriction of all philosophy to the six Darsanas, and the very use of the term, is late mediaeval. The six are of course not mutually exclusive; and this, and the omissions in the classification of philosophy under these six heads, render it rather like a classification of animals into men, horses, birds, ghosts, beetles, and sparrows.}

Return to top