Chap. XXXVIII.—Of Plato, whose doctrine approaches more nearly to the truth

Chap. XXXVIII.—Of Plato, Whose Doctrine Approaches More Nearly to the Truth.

His disciple Plato, whom Tully speaks of as the god of philosophers, alone of all so studied philosophy that he approached nearer to the truth; and yet, because he was ignorant of God, he so failed in many things, that no one fell into worse errors, especially because in his books respecting the state he wished all things to be common to all. This is endurable concerning property, though it is unjust. For it ought not to be an injury to any one, if he possesses more than another through his own industry; or to be a profit to any one, if through his own fault he possesses less. But, as I have said, this is capable of being endured in some way. Shall there be a community p. 237 of wives also, and of children? Shall there be no distinction of blood, or certainty of race? Shall there be neither families, nor relationships, nor affinities, but all things confused and indiscriminate, as in herds of cattle? Shall there be no self-restraint in men, no chastity in women? What conjugal affection can there be in these, between whom on either side there is no sure or peculiar ¹⁵⁰³ love? Who will he dutiful towards a father, when he knows not from whom he was born? Who will love a son, whom he will reckon as not his own? ¹⁵⁰⁴ Moreover, he opened ¹⁵⁰⁵ the senate house to women, and entrusted to them warfare, magistracies, and commands. ¹⁵⁰⁶ But how great will be the calamity of that city, in which women shall discharge the duties of men! But of this more fully at another opportunity.  

Zeno, the master of the Stoics, who praises virtue, judged that pity, which is a very great virtue, should be cut away, as though it were a disease of the mind, whereas it is at the same time dear to God and necessary for men. For who is there who, when placed in any evil, would be unwilling to be pitied, and would not desire the assistance of those who might succour them, which is not called forth so as to render aid, except by the feeling of pity? Although he calls this humanity and piety, he does not change the matter itself, only the name. This is the affection which has been given to man alone, that by mutual assistance we might alleviate our weakness; and he who removes this affection reduces us to the life of the beasts. For his assertion that all faults are equal, proceeds from that inhumanity with which also be assails pity as a disease. For he who makes no difference in faults, either thinks that light offences ought to be visited with severe punishments, which is the part of a cruel judge, or that great offences should be visited with slight punishments, which is the part of a worthless judge. In either case there is injury to the state. For if the greatest crimes are lightly punished, the boldness of the wicked will increase, and go on to deeds of greater daring; and if a punishment of too great severity is inflicted for slight offences, inasmuch as no one can be exempt from fault, many citizens will incur peril, who by correction might become better.  

Footnotes

237:1503

Proprius.  

237:1504

Alienum.  

237:1505

Reseravit. Others read “reservavit.”  

237:1506

[A republic of “philosophers” (credula gens) was set up in France (a.d. 1793), to prove their idiotic incompetency for practical affairs.]