14. And on account of the atoms having colour

14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed.

From the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or fire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sûtra refers.