IV. Tactical Dispositions

The Art of War, by Lionel Giles, [1910], at sacred-texts.com

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IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS ¹.

1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. ²

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3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, ¹ but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. ²

4: Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it. ³

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. ⁴

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength: attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; ⁵

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he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. ¹ Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. ²

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. ³

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" ⁴

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10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; ¹ to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. ²

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. ³

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. ⁴

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13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. ¹ Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. ²

14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. ³

I5. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. ⁴

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16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; ¹ thus it is in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. ²

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19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. ¹

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions. ²

Footnotes

26:1 # is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally, "form," "body," it comes to mean "appearance," "attitude" or "disposition;" and here it is best taken as something between, or perhaps combining, "tactics" and "disposition of troops." Ts‘ao Kung explains it as # "marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the# dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions (#), and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can # "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy." In the modern text, the title of the chapter appears as #, which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates "the order of battle."

26:2 That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has: "The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's camp," which, though certainly an improvement on his previous attempt, is still incorrect.

27:1 "By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions" (Chang Yü).

27:2 The original text reads #, which the modern text has further modified into #. Capt. Calthrop makes out the impossible meaning, "and further render the enemy incapable of victory."

27:3 Capt. Calthrop translates: "The conditions necessary for victory may be present, but they cannot always be obtained," which is more or less unintelligible.

27:4 For #, I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in §§ 1–3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that # should suddenly become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the Yü Lan is #.

27:5 Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know p. 28 his whereabouts. The # of this passage have of course no connection with the # "Nine situations" of chap. XI.

28:1 Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts‘ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu, explains # as the hills, rivers, and other natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the attacked, and # as the phases of weather which may be turned to account by the attacking party. Capt. Calthrop's "The skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven" conveys no meaning at all.

28:2 Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following: "If these precepts be observed, victory is certain."

28:3 As Ts‘ao Kung remarks, # "the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch‘üan allude§ to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior army of # Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of # Ch‘êng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story, see #, chap. 34, #. Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly with: "A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may not be a true success."

28:4 True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: # "To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, p. 29 to foil the enemy's intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that

29:1 # is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers. Cf. Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzŭ, #, et al.

29:2 Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: # Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; # Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and # Shih K‘uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.

29:3 The original text, followed by the T‘u Shu, has #. But this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness of #, which means literally: "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."

29:4 Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."

30:1 Ch‘ên Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yü: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win." Li Ch‘üan thinks that the character # should be # "to have doubts." But it is better not to tamper with the text, especially when no improvement in sense is the result.

30:2 The T‘u Shu omits #. # here = #. Chia Lin says it is put for # in the sense of #; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop altogether ignores the important word, #

30:3 A # "counsel of perfection," as Tu Mu truly observes. # need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.

30:4 Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."

31:1 For # and #, see supra, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yü is wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as # and # respectively.

31:2 It is not easy to distinguish the four terms # very clearly. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to # form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and to # make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to # a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then # victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in #, which some commentators take as a calculation of numbers, thereby making it nearly synonymous with #. Perhaps # is rather a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition (# or #), while # is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu defines # as #, and adds: # "the question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that # is given as logically consequent on #; this certainly points to the latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop's version the less said the better.

32:1 Literally, "a victorious army is like an # i (20 oz.) weighed against a # shu (1/24 oz.); a routed army as a shu weighed against an i." The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the # to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch‘üan of the T‘ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.

32:2 The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the general sense is plain. The T‘u Shu omits #. A # = 8 # or Chinese feet.